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Who has more influence on Asian
stock markets around the subprime
mortgage crisis – the US or China?
Chien-Chung Nieh, Chao-Hsiang Yang and Yu-Sheng Kao*
Department of Banking and Finance, Tamkang University, No. 151,
Yingzhuan Road, Danshui District, New Taipei City 251, Taiwan
This article employed the Momentum Threshold Autoregressive (M-TAR)
model to investigate the changes in the asymmetric co-integration
relationship between the US and China’s stock markets and Asian stock
markets of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Korea and India
around the subprime mortgage crisis. The main empirical findings
demonstrated that with the application of traditional symmetric co-
integration tests, the subprime mortgage crisis did not reinforce the co-
movement trends between the US and China’s markets and Asian
markets. However, with the application of the M-TAR model for the
threshold co-integration test, there was significant increase in these
asymmetric co-integration relationships between them during the period
of the subprime mortgage crisis, and our empirical results show evidence
that the linkage between the US and China’s stock markets is low, and
investors can somewhat diversify risks by investing in the United States and
China simultaneously.
Keywords: M-TAR model; asymmetric co-integration; stock markets;
subprime mortgage crisis
JEL Classification: C32; G11; G15
I. Introduction
The United States is the largest economic entity and
importer of goods in the world. The impact of an
economic shock in the United States would affect a
broader region. On the other hand, China is a major
trading partner to the Pacific Basin countries and has
political influence on them. This study aims to exam-
ine which country has more influence on the Asian
stock markets by testing the transmission effect
between the US and Asian markets and between
China and Asian markets.
The recent subprime mortgage crisis in the United
States, which seems to have had a perceived structural
change to the influences of stockmarkets in theUnited
States and China, has had a great effect upon the
financial markets of the whole world. Therefore, we
use this crisis as the breaking point to investigate the
influence of the US and China’s stock markets on the
Asian stock markets.
In empirical literature, four different approaches
have been utilized to measure how shocks are trans-
mitted internationally: cross-market correlation coeffi-
cients, Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
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(ARCH) or Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) frameworks, co-
integration techniques and direct estimation of specific
transmission mechanisms by using the probit model.
King and Wadhwani (1990) and Lee and Kim
(1993) both used the correlation approach and
found that international stock markets had become
more interrelated after the US stock market collapse
in October 1987. Cha and Oh (2000) also showed
evidence that the links between the developed mar-
kets and the Asian emerging markets began to
increase after the US stock market collapse in
1987. Hamao et al. (1990) utilized the GARCH
model and pointed out the volatility spillovers of
the stock indices from New York to Tokyo,
London to Tokyo and New York to London after
the US stock market collapse in 1987. Many
researchers considered that significant increases of
correlation or co-movement of the stock markets
were the indicators of a contagion effect. Ghosh
et al. (1999) utilized the co-integration method to
investigate which Asian developing markets were
moved by the markets of Japan and the United
States. Sheng and Tu (2000) found that co-
integration did not exist in the 11 Asian stock mar-
kets and US stock markets before the 1997 Asian
financial crisis, but it did during the financial crisis,
which demonstrated a contagion effect.
However, the problems of ‘nonlinear’ or ‘asym-
metric’ characteristics are seldom considered in the
traditional co-integration method. Li and Lam (1995),
Koutmos (1998) and Chiang (2001) pointed out that a
co-integration relationship between stock markets was
asymmetric. Wang and Lin (2005), Shen et al. (2007)
and Chang (2008, 2010) further employed the asym-
metric co-integration test for their empirical studies. To
investigate how the asymmetric phenomenon influ-
enced the transmission effect, we apply the asymmetric
threshold co-integration method to compare the trans-
mission effects of the US and China stock markets on
the Asian stock markets, pre- and during the subprime
mortgage crisis.
The traditional symmetric co-integration tests by
Engle and Granger (1987) and the Momentum
Threshold Autoregressive (M-TAR) model by
Enders and Siklos (2001) are both employed to
investigate the transmission effect. Section II dis-
cusses the M-TAR model. Section III describes the
data and empirical results. Section IV concludes
our study.
II. The M-TAR Model
We employed the Enders and Siklos (2001) M-TAR
model to examine the ‘asymmetric transmission effect’
from the US to Asian markets and China to Asian
markets around the subprime mortgage crisis. The
long-term equilibrium relationship is as follows:
Yi;t ¼ 0 þ 1Xt þ ei;t i ¼ 1; 2; : : : ; 6 ð1Þ
whereYi,t is the logarithm of the Asian stock index for
country i on period t and i= 1, 2, . . ., 6 represents six
Asian countries, respectively. Xt* implies the loga-
rithm of the US or China stock index, while t* repre-
sents period t for China but period t – 1 for the United
States with the time lag of the trading day which must
be considered (Eun and Shim, 1989; Liu et al., 1998).
0 and 1 are the regression coefficients. ei,t measures
the estimated residuals. Enders and Siklos (2001) mod-
ified et to allow for two types of asymmetric error
corrections based on a co-integrating relationship as
depicted in Equation 1.
et ¼Mtr1et1 þ ð1MtÞr2et1 þ
Xp1
i¼1
bieti þ t
ð2Þ
Mt ¼ 10

if et1  r
if et1<r
ð3Þ
whereMt is theHeaviside indicator function, r1 and r2
are the adjustment coefficients of asymmetric error
corrections term based on a co-integrating relation-
ship as depicted in Equation 1, b are the regression
coefficients of the lagged value of different error terms
in Equation 2,  is the residual of the white-noise
disturbance in Equation 2 and r denotes the unknown
threshold values. Equations 2 and 3 represent the M-
TAR model.1
In the M-TAR model, the adjustment is modelled
by r1et–1 thatMt = 1 when et–1 is above the thresh-
old value r and by r2et–1 that Mt = 0 when et–1 is
below the threshold value. The no co-integration
hypothesis (H0: r1 = r2 = 0) was tested using speci-
fically derived critical values provided by Enders and
Siklos (2001). If the null of no co-integration was
rejected, the null of symmetric (H0: r1 = r2) can be
tested using a standard F-test.
1 Enders andGranger (1998) pointed out theM-TARmodel was especially valuable when adjustment was asymmetric such that
the series exhibited more ‘momentum’ in one direction than the other.
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III. Data and Empirical Results
This research is conducted using theUS, China and six
other Asian stock indices. The S&P 500 and the
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Composite are
selected to represent the stock indices for the United
States and China, respectively. The other six Asian
stock indices are from Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Japan, Korea and India.2 We have ana-
lysed the data of synchronized trading days in all stock
markets. The entire daily sample period was from 2
January 2004 to 31 March 2010.
Since there is still no consensus on the start date for
the subprime mortgage crisis, it is not easy to deter-
mine an exact date. In general, some scholars
(Gorton, 2008) consider the outburst of the financial
crisis of the New Century Financial Corp. as the begin-
ning of the crisis. Therefore, we used the date on which
the trading of stocks of New Century Financial Corp.
was terminated in NewYork Stock Exchange (NYSE),
that is, 13 March 2007, as the cutting point. Thus, the
period of ‘the pre-subprime mortgage crisis’ was
defined as the period from 2 January 2004 to 13
March 2007 and the period of ‘during the subprime
mortgage crisis’ was defined as the period from 14
March 2007 to 31 March 2010.
Table 1 represents the summary statistics for all the
series, and Table 2 shows that there are no symmetric
co-integration and asymmetric co-integration rela-
tionships between the US and China’s markets, the
results of which show evidence that the linkage
between the US and China’s stock market is low.
The results of the three unit root tests, Augmented
Dickey and Fuller (ADF; 1984), Phillips and Perron
(PP; 1988) and Kwiatkowski et al. (KPSS; 1992), are
summarized in Table 3. All the variables are the I(1)
type series at the 1% significance level.
Table 4 represents the results of the Engle–Granger
test for symmetric co-integration between the US and
Asian markets and between China and the Asian mar-
kets in the entire period (Panels A and B of Column 1
in Table 4), the period of the pre-subprime mortgage
crisis (Panels A and B of Column 2 in Table 4) and the
period of during the subprime mortgage crisis (Panels
A and B of Column 3 in Table 4). Column 1 in Table 4
shows that there are no co-integration relationships
between the US and each of the Asian markets and
between China and each of the Asian markets in the T
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2 There are restricted fluctuation ranges, 7% for Taiwan and 10% for China, respectively, in the Taiwanese and Chinese stock
markets, but there are no such restrictions in the US and Hong Kong stock markets. A reviewer in the sixth China Financial
Association Anniversary Conference (CFAAC) questioned whether the restrictions would affect researchers’ evaluation results.
In our study, there were only 23 days on which the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) Weighted Index exceeded the
7% limit and 17 days on which the SSE Composite Index exceeded the 10% limit in our research period, which accounted for
less than 3% of the entire samples. Shen and Wang (1998) pointed out that when the samples with restricted ranges were less
than 5% of the entire samples, their impact on the evaluation results could be considered insignificant.
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entire period. The results of Column 2 in Table 4 show
that only the US and Hong Kong markets are co-
integrated at the 5% significance level, whereas there
are no co-integration relationships for all the other
pairs in the pre-subprime mortgage crisis period.
Column 3 in Table 4 shows that the only co-
integration relationship exists between China and
Korea markets at the 10% significance level; all the
other pairs show no co-integration relationships dur-
ing the subprime mortgage crisis period. Since the
results in Table 4 show that the significant long-term
relationship increase only happened between China
and Korea markets around the subprime mortgage
crisis, this result does not support the transmission
effect from the US or China to the Asian markets
caused by the subprime mortgage crisis.
Table 5 represents the results of the threshold co-
integration test with the null of no co-integration (FC)
and symmetric adjustment (FA). In Panel A of Column
1 in Table 5, the FC statistics rejected the null at the 1%
significant level and the FA statistics rejected the null at
least at the 10% level forUnited States–Taiwan,United
States–Hong Kong, United States–Japan, United
States–Korea and United States–India relationships
in the entire period. The rejection of both nulls implies
an asymmetric co-integration relationship for each
of the above pairs of countries. We also found in
Panel B of Column 1 in Table 5 that the asymmetric
co-integration exists between China and Hong Kong
and China and Korea since both nulls were rejected at
least at the 5% significant level for these two pairs of
countries in the entire period.
Furthermore, Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5 represent
the results of the threshold co-integration relationship
tests around the subprime mortgage crisis. Column 2
in Table 5 shows that, with the exception that the
Table 2. Relationships between the United States and China
(1) Entire period (2/1/2004 to
31/3/2010; N=1247
(2) Pre-subprime mortgage
crisis (2/1/2004 to
13/3/2007; N= 638)
(3) During subprime mortgage
crisis (14/3/2007 to
31/3/2010; N= 609)
Engle–Granger co-integration –0.704, AIC = –849.229 –22.03, AIC = –818.087 –0.319, AIC = –891.759
Ender–Siklos threshold AIC = –1157.756 AIC = –1126.614 AIC = –1209.304
co-integration
Fc Fa R Fc Fa R Fc Fa R
4.058 1.589 -0.01868 4.346 1.776 0.01324 3.636 1.121 -0.02459
Notes: The critical values of the Engle–Granger co-integration are taken from Engle and Yoo (1987). The lag length of difference
ks is selected by minimizing AIC; r is the estimated threshold value. FC and FA denote the F-statistics for the null hypothesis of no
co-integration and symmetric adjustment, respectively. Critical values are taken from Enders and Siklos (2001). The threshold
value is endogenously determined by using the Chan’s (1993) grid search method to find the consistent estimate of the threshold.
This method arranges the values, {et}, in an ascending order and excludes the smallest and largest 15%, and the consistent
estimate of the threshold is the parameter that yields the smallest Residual Sum of Squares (RSS) over the remaining 70%.
Table 3. Results of various unit root tests
Level First difference
ADF PP KPSS ADF PP KPSS
United States -1.4368(1) -1.5009 5.2397*** -17.2314(5)*** -36.6190*** 0.0793
Taiwan -1.4696(7) -1.5822 3.7241*** -16.4603(6)*** -34.5620*** 0.0902
Hong Kong -1.4424(9) -1.5345 2.0340*** -17.2314(8)*** -36.6190*** 0.0793
Singapore -1.4692(8) -1.4990 6.4723*** -16.1312(7)*** -35.5446*** 0.1602
Japan -1.2754(9) -1.3547 6.2189*** -17.4413(9)*** -35.6042*** 0.1961
Korea -1.4837(5) -1.5486 5.2359*** -16.4166(4)*** -35.1614*** 0.1012
India -1.0253(6) -1.0409 8.0021*** -16.6577(5)*** -34.2104*** 0.1018
China -0.7695(8) -0.7561 4.4687*** -16.4727(9)*** -35.8116*** 0.2256
Notes: The numbers in the parentheses are the appropriate lag lengths selected by minimizing AIC. The critical values for the
10%, 5% and 1% significance levels of ADF, PP and KPSS are (-2.567948, -2.863659, -3.435402), (-2.567944, -2.863651,
-3.435385) and (0.3470, 0.4630, 0.7390), respectively. The null hypothesis of ADF and PP is nonstationary (unit root); the null
hypothesis of KPSS is stationary (non-unit root).
***Significant at 1% level.
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pair of United States–Japan is asymmetrically co-
integrated at the 10% level, all the other pairs of
countries, regardless of whether they were compared
with the US or China market, show no co-integration
relationships in the pre-subprime mortgage crisis per-
iod. Moreover, in Column 3 of Table 5, we found that
both FC and FA reject the two nulls at least at the 5%
level regardless of whether it is the US case or the
China case, which implies that all the pairs of the
countries investigated are asymmetrically co-
integrated during the subprimemortgage crisis period.
By further comparisons of FC and FA statistics in
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, we found that the co-
integration relationships have significantly increased
after the shock of the crisis for all the pairs of the coun-
tries considered, which confirms a ‘transmission effect’
caused by the subprime mortgage crisis on our investi-
gated samples. The asymmetry in the co-integration
relationships has also significantly increased after the
shock for all the pairs of the countries considered.
Moreover, based on Column 3 in Table 5, we see that,
during the subprimemortgage crisis period, the strengths
of the co-integration relationships between the US and
the Asian markets considered are ordered as follows:
United States–Singapore, United States–Japan, United
States–Hong Kong, United States–Taiwan, United
States–Korea and United States–India, whereas the
co-integrated strengths between China and the Asian
markets considered are ordered as China–Hong Kong,
China–Korea, China–Japan, China–Singapore, China–
India andChina–Taiwan. This can be explainedwith the
fact that the security markets of Singapore, Japan and
HongKong are relatively advanced.They thus hadmore
linkage with the USmarkets and showed stronger trans-
mission effects in their relationships. On the other hand,
viewed as emerging markets, Taiwan, Korea and India
security markets had less linkage with the USmarket. In
addition, being part of China since 1997, Hong Kong
had the strongest transmission effect with China in their
security markets during the subprime mortgage crisis
period.
IV. Conclusions
The co-integration relationship between stock mar-
kets represents market co-movement. In this study,
we examine which country has more influence on the
Asian stock markets by co-integration test for testing
the transmission effect between the US and Asian
markets and between China and Asian markets.
Two major findings are summarized in our study.
Firstly, the result of the symmetric Engle–Granger
co-integration tests showed less co-integration
between either the United States or China and each
of the six Asian markets considered, which does not
support the transmission effect from the US or China
to Asian markets. However, the results of the
Enders–Siklos asymmetric threshold co-integration
test showed that, for both cases of the United States
and China, the co-integration relationships with the
six Asian markets increased due to the subprimemort-
gage crisis. With further analyses, we see that the
asymmetric co-integration relationships between the
US and Asian markets exist in both periods of pre-
and during the subprime mortgage crisis, while the
Table 4. Results of the Engle–Granger test for co-integration
(1) Entire period
(2) Pre-subprime
mortgage crisis
(3) During subprime
mortgage crisis
Engle–Granger ADF
statistic
Engle–Granger ADF
statistic
Engle–Granger ADF
statistic
Co-integration
statistics
Panel A – United States
Taiwan -1.458 -2.587 -1.443 Decrease
Hong Kong -1.061 -3.728** -2.104 Decrease
Singapore -1.292 -2.801 -1.727 Decrease
Japan -2.032 -1.908 -2.376 Increase
Korea -1.232 -1.850 -2.527 Increase
India -0.689 -2.999 -1.429 Decrease
Panel B – China
Taiwan -2.105 -2.488 -2.379 Decrease
Hong Kong -2.632 -1.393 -2.521 Increase
Singapore -1.953 -1.341 -2.575 Increase
Japan -1.235 -1.557 -2.705 Increase
Korea -2.352 -1.272 -3.144* Increase
India -1.912 -1.187 -1.959 Increase
Note: * and **Significant at 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
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relationships between China and the Asian markets
changed from not being co-integrated in the pre-crisis
period to showing significant co-integration relation-
ships in the during-crisis period. Therefore, it can be
concluded that China showed more influence on those
Asian markets during the recent subprime mortgage
crisis; however, its influence is less than that of the
United States.
Secondly, this study finds that the relative advanced
Asian markets, for example, Singapore, Japan and
Hong Kong markets, showed stronger transmission
effects in their relationships with the US market. The
emerging markets, Korea, Taiwan and India markets,
had less linkage with the US market. Moreover, the
transmission effect was the strongest between China
and Hong Kong in their security markets during the
subprime mortgage crisis period.
The increases of the co-integration relationships
caused by the subprimemortgage crisis had some impli-
cations, which demonstrated that the financial crisis
had weakened the effectiveness of international portfo-
lio diversification. However, because the linkage
between the US and China’s stock market is low, inter-
national investors can somehow diversify risks by
investing in the US and China markets simultaneously.
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